Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2000

Doxey-Layton Company v. Clark : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gaylen S. Young, Jr.; Attorney for Appellants; Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall, and McCarthy; Gregory P.
Williams; Stephen J. Sorensen; Attorneys for Respondent.
George E. Mangan; Mangan, Draney and Mitton; Attorneys for Respondents.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Doxey-Layton Company v. Clark, No. 14097.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/173

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

/jc/7/
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DOXEY-LAYTON COMPANY, a corporation
and LYARD McCONKIE and ILENE McCONKIE,
his wife,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
Case No. 14097
vs,
VENDETTA CLARK, HAROLD RALPHS, TWILA
JOHNSON, CECIL G. RALPHS, RUBY POWELL,
and DENNIE RALPHS, being the heirs of the
deceased, WILLIAM A. RALPHS and BERTHA
RALPHS, his wife, and any unknown heirs
of the deceased, WILLIAM A. RALPHS and
BERTHA RALPHS, his wife, and DENNIE RALPHS
and CHEVRON OIL COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendants - Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS OTHER THAN CHEVRON OIL COMPANY
Appeal from Judgment of the Fourth District Court
Duchesne County, State of Utah
The Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge
GEORGE E. MANGAN
MANGAN, DRANEY & MITTON
P. 0. Box 788
Roosevelt, Utah
84066
Attorneys for Respondents
Other Than Chevron Oil Company
GAYLEN S. YOUNG, JR.
2188 Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellants
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Gregory P. Williams
Stephen J. Sorensen
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Attorneys for Respondent, Chevron
O i l Company

FILED
SEPa9197-i
CJw*. Supram Cowl-, (fab

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DOXEY-LAYTON COMPANY, a corporation
and LYARD McCONKIE and ILENE McCONKIE,
his wife,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
Case No. 14097
vs.
VENDETTA CLARK, HAROLD RALPHS, TWILA
JOHNSON, CECIL G. RALPHS, RUBY POWELL,
and DENNIE RALPHS, being the heirs of the
deceased, WILLIAM A. RALPHS and BERTHA
RALPHS, his wife, and any unknown heirs
of the deceased, WILLIAM A. RALPHS and
BERTHA RALPHS, his wife, and DENNIE RALPHS
and CHEVRON OIL COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendants - Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS OTHER THAN CHEVRON OIL COMPANY
Appeal from Judgment of the Fourth District Court
Duchesne County, State of Utah
The Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge
GEORGE E. MANGAN
MANGAN, DRANEY & MITTON
P. 0. Box 788
Roosevelt, Utah
84066
Attorneys for Respondents
Other Than Chevron Oil Company
GAYLEN S. YOUNG, JR.
2188 Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellants
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Gregory P. Williams
Stephen J. Sorensen
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Attorneys for Respondent, Chevron
Oil Company

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

2

ARGUMENT

7

POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT
THERE WAS A SCRIVENER'S MISTAKE IN THE
DEED DATED AUGUST 13, 1963, AND THAT
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SHOULD NOT
BAR THE REFORMATION OF SAID DEED BY
REASON OF THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL
IN PAIS
7

POINT II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED THE
TESTIMONY OF MAX GARDNER AND PROPERLY
MADE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW BASED IN PART ON THE TESTIMONY
OF MAX GARDNER
24

POINT III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT
THE PLAINTIFFS HAD NO RIGHT TO
TERMINATE THE LEASE WITH CHEVRON
OIL COMPANY

CONCLUSION.

27
30

CASES CITED
Bench v. Pace, ? Utah 2d ?, 538 P. 2d 180

12

Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah 415, 222 P.2d 571. . . . . . .12
McKellar v. McKellar, 23 Utah 2d 106, 458 P.2d 867. . .14,
Mauian Hotel, Inc. v. Naui Pineapple Co. 481 P.2d 310 .20
Howard v. West Jersey & Seashore Railroad Co.
102 N.J. Eq. 517, 141 A. 755, 757
Rice v. Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22,
456 P.2d 159

.20
. .20

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3), (1974)

29

AUTHORITIES CITED
6 Am Jur 2d, Assignments, Sec. 102, pages 283, 284. . .10
77 Am Jur 2d, Vendor and Purchaser, Sec. 289,
page 534

10

Williston on Contracts, Vol. 13, 3d Ed., Sec. 1552. . .12
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(7)

25

TAH
DOXEY-~LAYri uK ^OrlPANY, a c o r p o r a t i o n
a n d LYARD .McCONKIE a n d ILENE McCONKIE,
h i s v; i. f e f

Plaintiffs - A p p e ] 1 a n t: s ,
Case N o . 14097
vs,
VENDETTA ('LARK, HAROLI
rWILA
JOHNSON, CECIL O. RALPHS, PUPY POWELL,
and DENNIE PALPHS, being the heirs of the
deceased, WILLI ATI I . RALPHS and BERTHA
RALPHS, his wife, and any unknown heirs
of the deceased, WILLIAM A. PALPHS and
BERTHA RALPHS, his wife, and PENNIE R A H W:
and CHEVRON •'•! COMpAN v , * corporation,
Defendants

C :•_, p O i i U. CJ111 S ,

BRIEF

": CHEVRON OIL COMPANY
/.'A'YJ

K'^'NT '"^ ":^'.'j~py

- T-

Plaint iff F commenced the acrioa

"^TF

r.ASE

r

i

c

:- I- t • • 11 ; •<-• ] .th

(T-rtain roil r^'-rar'y and mineral riqhta: in Du
a a,-

lease to be valid, ...-.]

o;

•'

' ,r,

. mineral lease to Chevron Oil Com; ariv declared

vo el. All o:' the ccfendani.F answered d^clarino

Chevron courv^

"

:

.-..

the ninc-ral

..-, ^;u;na^iii:s other r.Lan

-rcla iried, aJIeuinc m a t \ hey v-ro ertirloG re 7

he m i n e r a l r i g h t s i n arid LO t h e sui

a a nrooor av .

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
These defendants agree v i t !i I lw p] a i at j ff s *' statemei i t of
1 -- a., ap-.-s.' - •: . ;" '•:.. . •: .v. : aoa.a: a , -.•xcept to add the F a "t ,
tnaa : no deea i aat t h~- court ordered to ije reformer
recorcai

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The individual defendants seek affirmance of the entire
judgment of the lower court.

STATEMENT ON FACTS
On or about September 7, 1962, Willaim A. Ralphs and
Bertha Ralphs, his wife, hereafter referred to as Ralphs, did
sell, pursuant to a Uniform Real Estate Contract, to Hank
Swain and Donna Swain (see Exhibit 1 ) , the following described
real and personal property in Duchesne County, State of Utah:
TOWNSHIP 1 SOUTH, RANGE 4 WEST, UINTAH SPECIAL .MERIDIAN
Section 1:

Southeast Quarter of Northwest Quarter;
Northeast Quarter of Southwest Quarter;
and the West half of the Northeast quarter.

Section 12: Northeast quarter of Northeast quarter.
TOGETHER with 130 shares of capital stock of Dry Gulch
Irrigation Company, Class "A" Stock.
ALSO: One (1) oil heating stove and One (1) Butane tank.
TOGETHER with an undivided 25 percent of oil, gas and
mineral rights but excepting therefrom a lease now in
existence.
(NOTE:

The mineral lease referred to above, is not the mineral

lease that is of concern to this law suit.)
At the time Exhibit 1 was executed, the Ralphs also
executed a warranty deed from themselves as grantors to the
Swains as grantees, that was placed in escrow at First Security
Bank of Utah, Roosevelt office.

However, there was an error in

the legal description of the property sold by Ralphs to
Swains, in that that portion of Section 1 described as the
West half of the Northeast quarter should have been the West
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half of the Southeast quarter.

Prior to August 13, 1963, the

Swains did bargain, sell and assign all of their rights, title
and interest in and to said contract between themselves and the
Ralphs to K. C. Ranches, Inc., at which time the error in the
legal description became apparent.

Without preparing a new

Uniform Real Estate Contract, K. C. Ranches Inc. entered into
an "Amendment to Uniform Real Estate Contract" (Exhibit 2) with
the Ralphs, wherein the parties acknowledged the erroneous
legal description and the assignment from Swains to K. C.
Ranches.

The parties specifically provided in said amendment,

"Whereas, the parties hereto mutually desire to amend said
contract the legal description contained therein." and "Except
as herein modified, all remaining terms, conditions and provisions
of said Uniform Real Estate Contract shall remain in full force
and effect." (Emphasis added).
Due to the error in the legal description, and as an
accommodation to K. C. Ranches, the Ralphs executed a new
warranty deed (Exhibit 3) wherein K. C. Ranches Inc. was named
the grantee, and the correct legal description was used.
Due to a scrivener's mistake, the new warranty deed did
not contain a reservation of 75% of said mineral rights
in favor of said grantors, as called for in the original
contract of sale (Exhibit 1) and in the amendment to the same
(Exhibit 2 ) . However, before the Ralphs would sign said amendment
or the new deed, they were personally assured by the President
of K. C. Ranches, Mr. Carl Bennett, that except for the
change in the legal description, everything would remain the
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same, including mineral rights (see lines 15-20, pg. 27 of
Transcript, or pg. 181 of Record).
From and after August 13, 1963, until on or about May 15,
1970, said Uniform Real Estate Contract, together with its
amendment and the warranty deed, remained escrowed.

When the

contract was fully performed, the warranty deed was released
from escrow, delivered to the plaintiff Doxey-Layton, and on
May 15, 1970, it was duly recorded in the records of Duchesne
County, Utah, (Exhibit 3 ) .
On September 23, 1965, the Ralphs did lease all of the
subject mineral acres to the defendant Chevron, which lease
was duly recorded in the records of Duchesne County, Utah,
(Exhibit 10) , and in 1972 a producing v/ell was drilled on said
land.
On or about November 4, 1965, the plaintiff Doxey-Layton
became aware of the fact that one of its employees, namely
Mary Bennett, the wife of said Carl Bennett, the President of
K. C. Ranches, Inc., had wrongfully used or embezzled funds of
Doxey-Layton, which funds were used to acquire certain assets
and properties of K. C. Ranches, Inc., including the property
which is the subject of this litigation.

By way of partial

restitution, Mary Bennett, Carl Bennett and K. C. Ranches,
Inc., assigned and conveyed all of their rights, title and
interest in and to the subject property to the plaintiff
Doxey-Layton (See Exhibits 4, 5, and 6 ) .
The plaintiff Doxey-Layton conveyed only its surface
rights in the subject lands by warranty deed (Exhibit 7)
4

and 3/8ths of its mineral rights by quit-claim deed (Exhibit
14), to the plaintiffs Lyard McConkie and Ilene McConkie, his
wife, which deeds were recorded May 15, 1970, in the office of
the Duchesne County Recorder.
By reason of the recording of the warranty deed, the
Ralphs were placed on constructive notice of the error in the
retention of the mineral rights on May 15, 1970. However,
actual notice was not received by the Ralphs until October,
1971.

Thereafter in November, 1971, Mr. Ralphs filed and

recorded an Affidavit of Interest in the office of the Duchesne
County Recorder, claiming 75% of the minerals in and to the
subject land (Exhibit 13). On or about May 27, 1972, the
Ralphs executed and delivered a quit-claim deed for all of
their minerals in the subject land, plus two-thirds of the
minerals in an additional 40 acres (see Exhibit 8), to the
individual defendants herein, which deed was duly recorded in
the office of the Duchesne County Recorder.

Any reference

herein to the individual defendants will mean those defendants
who were both the lawful heirs of the Ralphs and who succeeded
to the mineral interests of the Ralphs pursuant to Exhibit 8.
The attorney for the plaintiffs, knowing of the claims of
the individual defendants, did arrange for the attorney for
the individual defendants to accept service of process through
the mail from the plaintiffs1 attorney, on behalf of the individual
defendants.

The plaintiffs1 original complaint was filed in

January, 1973, and was thereafter twice amended by the plaintiff.
All of plaintiffs1 complaints acknowledged the claim of the
5

Ralphs and therefore that of the individual defendants by
stating that the Ralphs "may claim a 75% interest" in said
mineral rights.

However, in both the original complaint and

in the first amended complaint, the plaintiffs named the
Ralphs and only one of their grantees as parties to the action.
At the time, of both amendments, the Ralphs were deceased, but
prior to their death or the commencement of this action, the Ralphs
had deeded all of their mineral rights to the individual defendants
(Exhibit 8 ) , which deed was subsequently recorded on April 7,
1973.

The attorney for the individual defendants notified

plaintiffs1 attorney of that fact, first verbally and then in
the answer of the individual defendants.

The answer of the

defendant Chevron Oil Company in February, 1973, also placed
the plaintiffs on formal notice that the Ralphs were dead, prior
to the commencement of this action.

The attorney for the individual

defendants did encourage the plaintiffs1 attorney to make the
necessary corrections or amendments to plaintiffs1 complaint
before the individual defendants filed their response especially
since personal service would be waived.

Although said amendment

was promised by plaintiffs1 attorney, the same was not forthcoming
until seven (7) days after the individual defendants had determined
to go ahead and file their answer and counterclaim, at which
time the plaintiffs did then file their "Second Amended Complaint".
Subsequent to said filing, the plaintiffs moved the court for
leave to file the same, which leave was granted.
The plaintiffs sought summary judgment based on the
pleadings and affidavits, but the same was denied by the trial
6

court.

The matter was tried to the court on March 18, 1975.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THERE WAS A
SCRIVENER'S MISTAKE IN THE DEED DATED AUGUST 13, 1963,
AND THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SHOULD NOT BAR THE
REFORMATION OF SAID DEED BY REASON OF THE DOCTRINE
OF ESTOPPEL IN PAIS.
Nothing in the stipulated facts or the exhibits would
indicate that the warranty deed dated August 13, 1963, was
prepared by either the Ralphs or any of their agents.

The

Ralphs were not aware of the error in the legal description in
either the contract or the deed to Swains.. The error in the
description was discovered by either the Swains or K. C.
Ranches, Inc., or their agent, but in either event, the Swains
or K. C. Ranches, Inc. would bear the same legal relationship
to the Ralphs.

While the plaintiffs did not produce a copy of

the assignment from Swains to K. C. Ranches, Inc., it is
apparent from Exhibit 2 that the Ralphs were duly informed of
the assignment and accepted the substitution of K. C. Ranches,
Inc., in lieu of the Swains.

However, before the Ralphs would

execute either Exhibit 2 or Exhibit 3, they insisted that Mr.
Gardner be present (see Transcript pg. 24, line 30, and pg. 25,
lines 1-6). At the request of Mr. Bennett, Mr. Gardner
did accompany Mr. Bennett to the home of the Ralphs in Lehi,
Utah.

Prior to the execution of either of said documents,
7

Mr. Bennett reassured the Ralphs that the only purpose for
either the amendment or the deed would be to correct the
erroneous legal description, and that the mineral rights would
remain the same (Transcript, pg. 27, lines 15-20).
Based on the assurance of the President of K. C. Ranches,
Inc., the Ralphs did execute both the amendment to the Uniform
Real Estate Contract and the new deed.

It is unfortunate that

the scrivener's mistake was not noted at that time, but with
the verbal assurances that were given, and the express language
of the amendment stating that the only change was in the
legal description, and that "all remaining terms, conditions
and provisions....shall remain in full force and effect"
(emphasis added) would surely cause the average person or the
"reasonable man" to assume that the same would in fact be
done.
Due to the fact that the Uniform Real Estate Contract was
escrowed, said deed was not recorded until the purchaser
or purchasers had fully performed all of its or their obligations
under said contract.

Until said deed was duly recorded on May

15, 1970, the Ralphs and their assignees were not charged with
notice of the mistake.

The trial court correctly found that

the omission of the mineral rights was a scrivener's error, and
any serious reading of the amendment to the Uniform Real
Estate Contract will sustain that finding.
Despite aspersions against Mr. Gardner in plaintiffs'
brief, Mr. Gardner had no responsibility for the preparation
of either the warranty deed or the amendment to the contract.
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Mr. Gardner had no commission pending the successful execution
of the assignment from Swains to K. C. P.anches, Inc.

In fact,

as mentioned above, Gardner was brought into the K. C. RanchesRalphs transaction at the request of the President of K. C.
Ranches, Inc., after Mr. Ralphs had refused an annual contract
payment from Mr. Bennett (See Transcript pg. 24, lines 18-30,
and pg. 25, lines 1-24), and Ralphs had insisted that Mr.
Gardner be present before Ralphs did anything.

Surely, Mr.

Gardner's presence in the Ralphs1 home was as much or more of
an accommodation for K. C. Ranches as it would be for the
Ralphs.

In addition, Mr. Gardner did not give any "assurances"

to the Ralphs as he had none to give.

He did read the amendment

to them and on the deed he read only the persons involved and
the legal description (Transcript, pg. 36, lines 23-28).

If

any representations were made by Mr. Gardner to the Ralphs,
they were surely the result of both the typed amendment (Exhibit
2 ) , which terms were reasonably clear, and the verbal representations
of Mr. Bennett.

But in no event was Mr. Gardner the agent of the

Ralphs in the Ralphs—K. C. Ranches, Inc. transaction.
The plaintiff Doxey-Layton is the assignee (Exhibit 6) of
all of the interests of K. C. Ranches, Inc. in and to the
subject land.

By no stretch of the imagination does Doxey-

Layton fit into the category of an innocent third-party
purchaser of either the land or the minerals.

Doxey-Layton took

what it could to recover a loss occasioned by one of its dishonest
employees.

By reason of the assignment from K. C. Ranches,

Inc. to Doxey-Layton, the plaintiff Doxey-Layton must stand in
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the same position as K, C. Ranches, Inc.f taking no more and
no less than K. C. Ranches had.

Said principle of law is well

established and is clearly enunciated in 6 Am Jur 2d, Assignments,
Sec. 102, as follows:
"In an action on the claim assigned, the assignee
is ordinarily subject to any setoff or counterclaim
available to the obligor against the assignor and to
all other defenses and equities which could have been
asserted against the chose in the hands of the assignor
at the times of the assignment, (pg. 283)
"The rule that the assignee of a nonnegotiable
instrument takes it subject to equities applies to
contracts generally, and has been applied to contracts
for the sale of land, contracts for the sale of chattels,
book accounts, bonds, receipts, bills of lading, and
judgments."
(pg. 28 4)
This principle is further stated in 77 Am Jur 2d,
Vendor and Purchaser, Sec. 289, at page 534, as follows:
Under the general rule that the assignee of a
nonnegotiable chose in action ordinarily acquires no
greater right than was possessed by his assignor, and
takes subject to all equities and defenses which could
• have been set up against the chose in action in the
hands of the assignor at the time of the assignment, it
is held that an assignee of a purchaser of real estate
takes subject to all the rights of the vendor under the
original contract of sale, including all defenses thereto
available to the vendor. Thus, it has been held that
the assignee of a land contract stands in no more favorable
position than the original purchaser, who has become barred
by laches from enforcing particular rights under the contract
against the vendor. The rule that an assignee of a
purchaser of real estate takes subject to all the rights
of the vendor under the original contract of sale has
been regarded as applicable irrespective of notice or
of the fact that the assignment was for a valuable
consideration.
(Emphasis added).
By reason of that principle of law, Doxey-Layton can have
no better position than that of its assignor, K. C. Ranches,
Inc.

Any defenses that are or were available to the Ralphs or

their grantees as to K. C. Ranches, Inc., would be available
10

to the Ralphs or their grantees as against the claims of DoxeyLayton.

Therefore, the unusual circumstances and verbal

assurances by Carl Bennett as the President of K. C. Ranches,
Inc., to the Ralphs at the time the allegedly corrected deed
and amendment to Uniform Real Estate Contract were executed, .
could properly be testified to by Mr. Gardner.
Plaintiffs1 brief correctly states the lav; (i.e. 13 Am
Jur. 2d, Section 34, page 525, and 17 Am. Jur. 2d, page 498),
relative to the finality of a deed or a contract, but defendants
do emphasis the importance of certain language in the citations
quoted in plaintiffs1 brief, namely "special circumstances," or
"where the one executing the document is not mislead as to its
contents".

It would seem that the most casual reading of the

transcript of the trial and/or of the amendment to the Uniform
Real Estate Contract (Exhibit 2) would cause the reasonable man
to conclude that when the Ralphs executed the deed (Exhibit 3),
there surely were some "unusual circumstances" and they were
"mislead as to its contents."
In addition, the plaintiffs have missed the fact, as
stressed by the lower court (Transcript, pg. 21, lines 2-30,
and pg. 22, lines 1-74), that the counterclaim of the individual
defendants seeks a reformation of the deed of August 15, 1963,
so as to correct the scrivener's error in said deed, which error
resulted from a mutual mistake of fact.

It was the uncontroverted

testimony of defendants' witnesses that the Ralphs intended to
reserve 75% of the minerals and that K. C. Ranches knew of that
fact and consented thereto.

This court has most recently
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ruled on the right of a party to reform an instrument to
conform to the oral understanding of the parties, in the case
of Bench v. Pace, ? Utah 2d ?, 538 P.2d 180, where this court
quoted from the earlier case of Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah 415,
222 P.2d 571, as follows:
"
The right to reform is given, at least
in part, so as to make the written instrument express
the bargain the parties previously orally agreed upon.
When a writing is reformed, the result is that an oral
agreement is by court decree made legally effective
although at variance with the writings which the parties
agreed upon as a memorial of their bargain. The
principle itself modifies the parole evidence rule."
(Emphasis added).
In this case, the individual defendants desire the court
to reform Exhibit 3 to conform to the oral terms agreed to by
the parties, as well as the written terms agreed to in Exhibits
1 and 2.
In Bench v. Pace (op. cit.) this court also quoted Williston
on Contracts, Vol. 13, 3d Ed. Sec. 1552, in part as follows:
"
It is understood that to warrant reformation
or recession, the court must be persuaded by the clearest
kind of evidence that a mistake has been made by both
parties, or in some cases by one, or that some other
basis exists upon which relief should be granted."
The individual defendants would urge that the review of
Exhibits 1 and 2 and the testimony of Max Gardner is the
"clearest kind of evidence" that a scrivener's mistake was made
in Exhibit 3 and that said deed should be reformed to conform
to the same.

"The omission of the [mineral rights] was

a mistake of fact rather than a mistake of law inasmuch as
in view of all circumstances it appears the omission was an
oversight on the part of the scrivener and the parties to the
12

[deed], and the conduct of the plaintiffs clearly shows that
they made no claim to the mineral estate until shortly before
this suit was initiated." (quoting in part from Bench v. Pace,
op. cit. at page 183).
Plaintiffs1 brief on page 8 tried to make a point of the
fact that Mr. Ralphs and the witnesses for the individual
defendants at the trial were confused as to the amount of
minerals the Ralphs and their grantees were to have. First, it
should be stressed, that Mr. Gardner and Mrs. Powell testified
that at a meeting in March, 1972, the President of Doxey-Layton
informed those present that Doxey-Layton was going to keep the
minerals. (See Transcript pg. 42, lines 2-25, and pg. 43, lines
7-13).

However, at a earlier meeting, the representatives of

Doxey-Layton had seemed "surprised" at the fact that they
had title to all of the minerals.
lines 24-28).

(See Transcript pg. 41,

Secondly, in the deed dated May 27, 1972,

(Exhibit 8), Mr. Ralphs did not claim 66 2/3% of the mineral
rights in the subject property.

A casual examination of

that document will indicate that the author of the same should
take no great pride in its draftsmanship, but that the
66 2/3% refers to mineral rights on separate land, and then
the word "ALSO" is used to describe the mineral acreage subject
to this litigation, and no percentage is indicated for it.
When you consider Exhibit 8 with Exhibit 13, and Exhibits 1
and 2, then there is a consistent claim by the Ralphs as to
the 75% of the minerals in the subject property.

Furthermore,

when Ralphs leased the subject minerals to Chevron in 19 65, it
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was necessary that they lease 100% of the minerals; the right
of K. C. Ranches, Inc., to any of the minerals was still
contingent upon the faithful performance by K. C. Ranches of
the terms contained in the Uniform Real Estate Contract,
including payment in full of the purchase price.

Thus for the

Ralphs to lease 100% of what they still had the right to lease
was not confusion but the proper thing to do.

After the

faithful performance by K. C. Ranches, Inc., or its assignees
of the contract of sale, then the Ralphs were obligated to
assign 25% of their lease rights with Chevron to K. C. Ranches,
Inc., or its assignees.

The Ralphs have always been willing to

do this, but the plaintiffs have sought to take advantage of
the scrivener's error, and claim the entire mineral estate.
Plaintiffs place great reliance on the McKellar case,
23 Utah 2d 106, 458 P.2d 867, however, the individual defendants
can find little solace for the plaintiffs there.

That case in-

volved the execution of a deed that included property that one
of the grantors allegedly did not intend to convey.

Several

years later, the objecting grantor and other family members
entered into a written agreement which in effect approved the
grant made in the earlier deed.

Furthermore, the deed had

been executed and recorded for more than 21 years prior to the
commencement of the action.

Contrary to plaintiffs1 assertion,

in the McKellar case the court does not make a hard and fast
rule that the time of the execution is the time that the statute
contemplates for running the statute of limitations.

Even

plaintiffs' brief acknowledges that, for it quoted the court
14

stating "The critical issue revolves around the time of discovery
of the mistake

" (Emphasis added).

If the time of discovery was to be presumed to be the date
that the deed was signed, then no party in this state could
afford to enter into an escrow agreement such as is involved
heref for all that an unscrupulous person would need to do
would be to have a contract which clearly indicates that the
minerals will be reserved to the grantor, but intentionally or
even inadvertently omit that reservation from the deed, which
deed is escrowed, then wait until the three years have passed,
and then claim the right to all of the minerals.

Such a con-

struction of the statute is so patently unfair and so contrary
to the real spirit of the statute, that no further comment
should be necessary.

Furthermore, the individual defendants

would draw the court's attention to the following citation
quoted in the plaintiffs1 brief, from the McKellar case (Ibid):
"Although plaintiffs have not pleaded the circumstances that contributed to the alleged unawareness of
the grantors at the time when they executed the conveyance
of 1947, the rule stated by the court in Hjermstad v.
Barkuloo is relevant:
'It is a general rule that a party will
not be relieved, either by a court of equity
or a court of law, where he executes an instrument without reading it, when he has it in his
hands and negligently fails to ascertain the contents of it; the other party not being guilty of
deceit or false representations as to its contents,
by means of which he is put off his guard.'"
(Emphasis added)
The trial court in weighing the testimony on behalf of the
defendants, which testimony the plaintiffs did not deny,
but only objected to because of the hearsay rule, believed
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the testimony of Mr. Gardner, that there were false or misleading representations by Mr. Bennett at the time Ralphs
executed the deed.

While the false representations may have

been made without malice, there was at least scienter on the
part of Mr. Bennett when he represented that except for the
change of the erroneous legal description, the second deed was
exactly the same as the first deed.

That representation was

false because the second deed did not contain the reservation of the
minerals.

The Ralphs did not prepare the second deed, nor was

it prepared under their direction.

There is nothing in the

record that should cause the plaintiffs to reach the conclusion
that the Ralphs "knew, or indeed should have known. . . there
actually was a mistake. . . in the August, 1963 deed."

Were it

not for the Ralphs children checking the record, the Ralphs
might never have actually learned of the mistake in that deed.
However, by reason of the recording statute, the Ralphs were
placed on constructive notice of the scrivener's mistake on May
15, 1970.
Plaintiffs would like to have this court hold that the
running of the statute of limitations coincided with the
execution of the deed.

The unreasonableness of the application .

of that proposition to this fact situation has already been
treated.

However, a response to the proposition that the

individual defendants did not "commence an action" within three
years of the recording of the deed on May 15, 1970, is needed.
First of all, the purpose and policy behind the statute of
limitations should be remembered.
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The statute's purpose is so

that there may be a time certain within which an action will be
"commenced".

Once that prescribed time has expired, a person

may know and be assured that the issue thus barred will not or
should not be brought up or raised again.

However, the statute

of limitations is a personal right and not a public right, for
its purpose is to assist the individual to prepare his defense
against the claim that will by statute be barred after the
prescribed date.

Since it is a personal right, the courts have

long acknowledged that a person can waive the defense of the
statute by either his expressed or implied consent or action.
It is the contention of the individual defendants that, the
trial court correctly found that inasmuch as the claim of the
individual defendants was in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim,
and since their claim was first raised in the plaintiffs1
pleadings, the defendants were entitled to assert the same
herein; and not withstanding that, the conduct of the plaintiffs1 counsel herein, relative to delays in amending plaintiffs'
pleadings so as to name the correct defendants, constitutes
estoppel in pais, which estoppel now bars the plaintiffs from
using the statute of limitations as a defense to the defendants'
counterclaim.
In this matter the plaintiffs would normally have been
able to rely upon the fact that after May 15, 1973, there would
be no actions by the Ralphs or their grantees, etc., relative
to the deed that was recorded on May 15, 1970, from Ralphs to
K. C. Ranches, Inc.

However, prior to May 15, 1973, the plaintiffs

started an action, in which they asserted the basis of the
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defendants' counterclaim.

The plaintiffs knew that the individual

defendants, were prepared to file their own action and that
they were represented by counsel.

If not, then why would the

plaintiffs' counsel rely upon the counsel for the individual
defendants to accept service on behalf of the individual defendants?
Also, the plaintiffs effected no other service in this matter
upon the individual defendants and had no jurisdiction over them,
except for the appearance of counsel on behalf of said defendants.
The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the Ralphs
claimed 75% of the minerals.

Thereafter, the individual defendants

tried to get the plaintiffs to amend their complaint so as to
correctly state the proper defendants, since both of the Ralphs
were dead and the Ralphs had conveyed their interest to the
individual defendants.

From the beginning, the plaintiffs were

charged with notice that they had omitted at least some of the
individual defendants.

Although the plaintiffs made their

first amendment in April, 1973, they still failed to correctly
identify and include the individual defendants.

Counsel for

the individual defendants again requested the plaintiffs to
correctly name the proper defendants.

Counsel for the plaintiffs

agreed to make the necessary amendments, but the same were not
made until immediately after the individual defendants had made
their general appearance in June, 1973, by filing their answer
and counterclaim.

Then the plaintiffs sought to defeat the counter-

claim of the individual defendants by asserting that the claim
was barred by the statute of limitations.

Since the plaintiffs

had been aware from the beginning of defendants' defense and
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counterclaim, it would appear that the plaintiffs1 delay in
filing their amended complaint, correctly naming the individual
defendants, was to induce the individual defendants to wait
until after May 15, 1973, to file their pleadings.

If such is

not the case, why else would the plaintiffs have waited so long
to file their second amended complaint, but then file it immediately,
even without leave of court, after the individual defendants
filed their answer and counterclaim?

The conclusion seems

obvious, and as the trial court found, the plaintiffs' actions,
whether intentional or not, were such that pursuant to the
doctrine of estoppel in pais, the plaintiffs are barred from
asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to the
individual defendants1 counterclaim.
Under Rule 13(a) URCP, the claim of the individual defendants was that of a compulsory counterclaim, and had to be
asserted in this action or forever be barred.

While the

individual defendants cannot find any language in any Utah
decision that would stand for the following proposition, the
defendants believe it would be good law for this court to hold:
if a defendant has a claim that is a compulsory counterclaim
and it is not barred by the statute of limitations at the time
a plaintiff commences an action, and if at the time the defendant
makes his general appearance in the action, he asserts the
compulsory counterclaim or elements thereof and claims relief
thereunder, then the plaintiff cannot plead the statute of
limitations as a bar to that action.

Whether this court will

adopt that proposition or another one, the counterclaim of these
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defendants should still stand because of the doctrine of estoppel
in pais, as found by the trial court.
The Hawaii case cited by the plaintiff, Mauian Hotel, Inc.
v. Naui Pineapple Co. 481 P.2d 310, does follow the equitable
theory that was submitted to the trial court, and from which
the trial court made a determination that the statute of
limitations was not a bar to the individual defendants filing
their counterclaim herein.

The Hawaiian court ruled on the

statute of limitations problem as follows:
"As stated by the New Jersey court in Howard v.
West Jersey & Seashore Railroad Co., 102 N.J. Eq.
517, 141 A. 755, 757 (1928):
1

(T)he statute of limitations is for the
benefit of individuals, and not to secure
general objects of policy; hence it may be
waived by express contract or by necessary
implication, or its benefits may be lost by
conduct invoking the established principles
of estoppel in pais * * Also it should be
noted that, while the doctrine of estoppel
in pais rests upon the ground of fraud, it is
not essential that the representations or conduct
giving rise to its application should be
fraudulent in the strictly legal significance
of that term, or with intent to mislead or
deceive; the test appears to be whether in all
the circumstances of the case conscience and
duty of honest dealing should deny one the
right to repudiate the consequences of his
representations or conduct;
(Emphasis
added).
This court reached a similar conclusion in Rice v. Granite
School District, 23 Utah 2d 22; 456 P.2d 159, where the court
states:
"Where the delay in commencing an action is
induced by the conduct of the defendant, or his privies,
or an insurance adjustor acting in his behalf, it cannot
be availed of by any of them as a defense.
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One cannot justly or equitably lull an adversary
into a false sense of security thereby subjecting his
claim to the bar of limitations, and then be heard to
plead that very delay as a defense to the action when
brought." (Emphasis added).
The plaintiffs were aware of the defense and counterclaim
of the individual defendants.

The plaintiffs were aware of the

evidence they must gather and of the documents and real evidence
that they would need in order to meet the defendants' counterclaim.

The policy reason for the statute of limitations as

regards the plaintiffs had thus been met.

The plaintiffs knew

that the individual defendants intended to file a counterclaim
as soon as the plaintiffs amended their complaint so as to name
them as parties to the action.

While it is true that the

individual defendants could have commenced a separate action
against the plaintiffs, for them to have done so would have
merely resulted in a duplicity of actions, since the controversy
and issues were already pending before the trial court.

For

the plaintiffs to have amended their complaint to name the
proper defendants would have helped to keep the court's calendar
from being unnecessarily cluttered.

Thus the individual defen-

dants chose to trust the representation of the plaintiffs that
the complaint would be amended and the proper parties named as
defendants.

It would be extremely harsh and inequitable to

allow the plaintiffs to commence and maintain an action that
only named part of the known defendants, as the plaintiffs did
herein; promise to amend their complaint so as to state the
proper parties, but not doing so until the statute of limitations had run; then allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint;
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and then, after the defendants had filed their counterclaim,
have the plaintiffs answer defendants1 counterclaim by alleging
the statute of limitations as a bar to the defendants1 claim.
The plaintiffs argue in their brief that there was "no
evidence taken, no proof offered on the question" of estoppel
in pais, and that the matter was first raised in argument
before the trial judge.

Defendants must concede that their

initial answer and counterclaim did not raise the issue of
estoppel in pais.

However, it should be recalled that defendants1

answer and counterclaim was filed immediately prior to the
plaintiffs filing their second amended complaint and before the
plaintiffs had responded to the defendants1 counterclaim by
alleging the statute of limitations.

While the defendants

probably should have then amended their answer and counterclaim
to allege estoppel, the plaintiffs were put on notice to the
defendants1 position relative to the same in the brief of the
individual defendants in opposition to plaintiffs1 motion for
summary judgment.

At the time of trial, counsel for the individual

defendants informed the court that the individual defendants
would rely upon the doctrine of estoppel in pais (see Transcript
pg. 11, lines 1-10).

This was never objected to by counsel for

the plaintiffs, and thus by at least the implied consent of the
plaintiffs, the matter of estoppel in pais was tried to the
court.

Under rule 15(b) URCP, the trial court should consider

all of the evidence and information available to it, in order to
determine the issues before the court, arising either from the
pleadings or by consent, either implied or expressed, of the
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parties, and thereafter, based on the same, to make and enter
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

In this case, the

court could consider all such evidence to determine that the
doctrine of "Estoppel in Pais" did apply as a bar to the plaintiffs
asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to the compulsory
counterclaim of the defendants.
The other statutes of limitations arguments briefly cited
and referred to in plaintiffs1 brief were fully responded to by
the individual defendants in their memorandum in opposition to
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment.

As far as mineral

rights are concerned, it would be impossible for the plaintiffs
to claim adverse possession to the same.

It was a stipulated

fact that the Ralphs had leased the minerals to Chevron in 1965
and had collected all of the rentals from said minerals from
1965 until a producing well was drilled thereon in 1972. There
can be no dispute that the plaintiffs paid all of the taxes on
the property, but the unrebutted affidavit of Jessie Peatross,
Duchesne County Accessor, is on file and of record in the
matter, to the effect that "mineral rights have not been assessed
in computing property taxes at any time since 1961."

Thus the

payment by the plaintiffs of the property taxes.on the property,
which they had a contractual obligation to pay, would have no
adverse effect upon the mineral rights of the Ralphs. However,
the receipt by the Ralphs of the lease payments for the mineral
rights up until the well was drilled in 1972, was certainly
adverse to the plaintiffs1 interests.

The plaintiffs failed to

introduce any evidence to indicate that at any time prior to
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the commencement of this action that they had requested any
portion of the rental payments for the mineral rights.

If the

plaintiffs had really felt that they had a bona fide right to
the minerals, they surely should have made some demand for the
payment of the rentals prior to this action.
In any event, the arguments of the plaintiffs regarding
the statute of limitations, either as to the three year limitation
or as to adverse possession or otherwise, must fail, and the
findings of the trial court should stand.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED THE TESTIMONY OF
MAX GARDNER AND PROPERLY MADE FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW BASED IN PART ON THE TESTIMONY
OF MAX GARDNER.
It is the contention of the plaintiffs that Findings 8, 10
and 12 of the trial court were founded entirely upon the
testimony of Max Gardner.
statement of the evidence.

However, that is an incorrect
Exhibit 2 is perhaps the best

evidence that the court had that the parties only intended to
amend the legal description by executing the Amendment to
Uniform Real Estate Contract.

Although the important language

of Exhibit 2 has previously been quoted herein, the individual
defendants would again quote the following from Exhibit 2.
"WHEREAS, the parties hereto mutually desire to amend said
contract the legal description contained therein;" and "Except
as herein modified, all remaining terms, conditions and provisions
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of said Uniform Real Estate Contract shall remain in full
force and effect."

(Emphasis added).

The language cited above

is more than sufficient to justify Findings 8 and 10 of the
trial court.

It is true that Finding 12 is based entirely upon

the testimony of Mr. Gardner.

However, the trial court correctly

ruled that Mr. Gardner's testimony relative to the conversation
between the Ralphs and Mr. Bennett as the President of K. C.
Ranches, Inc., was admissible as an exception to the hearsay
rule (Transcript pg. 22, lines 8-11; and pg. 32, lines 15-30).
It was the ruling of the trial court that plaintiff DoxeyLayton "stands in the same position as K. C. Ranches, and every
defense including objections to evidence and the whole bit
obtains for that is that they are in no better position than K.
C. Ranches, because they are the assignee of K. C. Ranches."
(op. cit. pg. 32, lines 26-30.)

The principle of law thus

stated by the trial court is discussed eariler in this brief on
page 10, where authority for the same is also cited.

The

exception to the hearsay rule that would seem to apply to this
particular situation is Rule 63(7) Utah Rules of Evidence,
which is as follows:
(7) Admissions by Parties. As against himself
a statment by a person who is a party to the action in
his individual or a representative capacity and, if the
latter, who was acting in such representative capacity
in making the statment."
Since Doxey-Layton, by reason of the assignment from K. C.
Ranches, stood in the same position as K. C. Ranches, then the
statements made by the president of K. C. Ranches, Inc. could
: ^.

be used in an action involving the assignee of K. G. R a n c h e s , . ,
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namely Doxey-Layton.

While it is true that neither K. C.

Ranches, nor the Bennetts were agents of any of the plaintiffs,
nevertheless, agency is not the basis of the exception to the
hearsay rule in this instance, but rather the assignment of a
principal's right from K. C. Ranches and Bennetts to DoxeyLayton and the statements of that principal at the time the
deed was executed is the basis of the exception.
Plaintiffs raise the further objection in their brief as
to whether Carl Bennett properly represented K. C. Ranches,
Inc.

As to what period of time Mr. Bennett's representation is

questioned, the plaintiffs remain silent.

However, this issue

was not raised at the time of the trial of the matter and
should now be ignored.

Nevertheless, the only conversation of

Bennett that was testified to was relative to the execution of
Exhibits 2 and 3 and statements made contemporaneously to said
execution by Bennett to the Ralphs.

The testimony of Gardner

relative to Bennett's representations to the Ralphs is certainly
consistent with the express terms of Exhibit 2, and leave no
real basis for us to question Bennett's ability.
In conclusion, it would seem to the individual defendants,
that the plaintiffs are making much to do about nothing as far
as the testimony of Gardner is concerned.

It would be easier

to understand their concern if Gardner's testimony did in fact
change any of the provisions contained in Exhibit 2. However,
since Gardner's testimony makes it easier to comprehend and
understand what the parties intended to do at the time the
written documents (Exhibits 2 and 3) were executed, then plaintiffs'
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concern seems baffling and unwarranted.

The plaintiffs were

aware that the defendants would probably call Gardner as a
witness and of the substance of his testimony prior to the
trial.

If they had felt that Gardner's testimony would be

untrue or inaccurate, they could have produced their assignor
for the purpose of rebutting the same.

However, since there

was really very little of Gardner's testimony that the plaintiffs
could rebut, as indicated above, they have obviously tried to
exclude Gardner's testimony as being either hearsay, prejudicial
or unbelievable and that failing, now on appeal, to discredit
the ability of Mr. Bennett to represent his company to the
Ralphs.
There is nothing these defendants can find in either the
record or the law to justify any of the contentions of the
plaintiffs in that regard.

The testimony of Max Gardner was

properly allowed by the trial court and Findings were properly
made from that testimony.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE PLAINTIFFS
HAD NO RIGHT TO TERMINATE THE LEASE WITH CHEVRON OIL
COMPANY.
One of the greatest difficulties that the plaintiffs have
had with this case is to understand that until May 15, 1970,
the deed dated August 15, 1963, (Exhibit 3) was a conditional
conveyance.

While the terms of that deed were absolute, the

deed itself could not be delivered and could not become operative
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to its grantees until such time as the grantees named therein
had fully and faithfully performed all of the covenants and
conditions provided for in Exhibits 1 and 2.

Therefore, the

conveyance or grant of land provided for in Exhibit 3 was
conditioned upon K. C. Ranches, Inc. and subsequently Doxey-.
Layton, faithfully performing all of the covenants of the
contract of sale.

Neither K. C. Ranches nor Doxey-Layton had a

right to that deed prior to the time that the contract had been
fully performed, which date was on or about May 15, 1970.
From and after August 15, 1963, the Ralphs remained in
open, notarious and continuous "occupancy" of the mineral
rights connected with the subject land.

The Ralphs and the

Ralphs alone received lease payments, first from the lease that
was in existence when Exhibit 1 was executed and then from the
lease that was executed in 1965. Had K. C. Ranches or any
other party tried to assert any ownership over these minerals
at any time prior to 1971, they surely would have learned of
the interest and claim of the Ralphs. When Doxey-Layton attempted
to convey a portion of the mineral rights to the McConkies, the
conveyance was done by way of a quit-claim deed (Exhibit 14).
However, when Doxey-Layton conveyed its interest in the surface
to McConkies, it was done by a warranty deed.

The difference

in the types of deed used by the plaintiffs is perhaps some
indication as to the regard that the plaintiffs had for the
legitimacy of their claim for all of the minerals.
From and after August 13, 1965, neither Doxey-Layton nor
the McConkies ever made any demand upon the Ralphs for any of
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the rentals of the minerals, nor did they make any attempt to
renounce the lease or in any way indicate that the Ralphs were
without authority to lease the same.

If there is a statute of

limitation problem in this matter, perhaps it arises from the
failure of the plaintiffs to commence an action within three
(3) years after the mineral lease to Chevron was recorded on
September 23, 1965, as provided in U.C.A. 78-12-26(3) (1974).
Doxey-Layton was well aware of the defect in their title
to the minerals when they executed a mineral lease in favor of
Flying Diamond Corporation (Exhibit 14).

A casual reading of

Exhibit 14 indicates that on October 30, 1972, Doxey-Layton was
making no warranties or representations as to what they did or
did not have, but rather acknowledged that their interest was
in dispute.

There was no need for that dispute.

A reading of

Exhibit 1 and 2 should have made it clear to the plaintiffs,
that the Ralphs were entitled to 75% of the minerals and that
Doxey-Layton, as assignees of K. C. Ranches and Swains were
entitled to 25% of the same.

If Doxey-Layton would have followed

the clear intent of the original parties, then there would have
been no disputation between these parties, Chevron would have
honored the conveyance of 25% from Ralphs to Doxey-Layton, and
the matter would have been settled.
As to other issues raised in Point III of plaintiffs1
brief, the individual defendants believe that the arguments
raised by the Defendant Chevron in its brief are an adequate
response thereto.

The mineral lease from Ralphs to Chevron

should not be terminated.
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CONCLUSION

:-:-.r,: -::•-.;:.-tr,.

The trial court made no reversible error, if any error at
, and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment
the trial court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
MANGAN, DRANEY & MITTON

George E. Mangan
P. 0. Box 788
Roosevelt, Utah
84066
,.-_•---.
Attorneys for Respondents
Other than Chevron Oil Company
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